Development thinking has evolved from the early works of W. Arthur Lewis and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and has been influenced by new and varied schools of thought. Emphases have shifted from capital accumulation and technical progress to human capital investment and social inclusion. Institutions have come into the equation, as has a prominent role for markets and for the state as drivers of development. Underlying these views were practicalities that shaped the way countries dealt with their need for foreign capital, the management of the macroeconomy, and their responses to economic and financial crises. There was a prominent role for the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, namely, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in shaping prevailing views of development and putting them into practice. This
Introduction
International financial institutions (IFIs) have strongly influenced development thinking and practice in recent decades. IFIs have exerted direct influence thorough the volume of their financial transfers, and indirectly, for example, through their impact on the resource transfers of others, including donors and the private sector. Even more important, IFI analysis and ideas have dominated aspects of development strategy and ideology. This chapter discusses the Bretton Woods institutions-the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Arguably, no development debate can take place without talk of the Washington Consensus and IMF conditionality, without reference to the number of people living below the poverty line according to World Bank data, or, more recently, without discussion of how IFI leaders are selected. The intellectual contributions of both major Bretton Woods institutions have declined in recent years, but for many decades, it has been difficult to separate national development plans from the views, funds, and influence of the IFIs.
This chapter explores how the IMF and World Bank have influenced thinking on global development by governments, donors, and the international community. The first section focuses on the period 1970-2000, when IFI resource transfers were large, and these institutions
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Page 4 had a major influence on paradigm shifts in development thinking. When governments were debating economic strategies, when aid programs were being designed or trade agreements were being negotiated, or when central bank agreements were being signed, the positions of the Bretton Woods institutions were seriously considered. The intellectual contributions of both institutions were unparalleled in their early decades; they included the Fleming-Mundell model (Boughton 2003 ) that underpinned international macroeconomic thinking, and the Chenery and Syrquin (1975) evidence that growth and distribution need not be at odds in development.
Next, we examine how the IMF and World Bank have fared in the past decade, and especially since the recent global financial crisis. We focus in particular on how global developments have affected IMF and Bank influence on thinking and practice, which we will argue has materially declined. We conclude with a few thoughts on whether the declining influence of the IMF and World Bank may be reversed.
The role of the IMF
Developing economies (DEs) have had unequal relations with the IMF. Unlike developed countries in crisis, DEs have been short of foreign exchange, exposed to commodity price
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Chapter 49 Page 5 fluctuations, and prone to balance-of-payments crises-and thus have been compelled to take advice without argument. The core IMF admonition has always been to keep the balance of payments (BOP) in line, inflation low, and fiscal accounts balanced-in order words, to pursue prudent macroeconomic policies. Although the tone of this advice was never pleasant (until very recently), it was not inherently harmful to development objectives. Indeed macroeconomic stability has long been identified as a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic progress. For example, the Spence Commission's Growth Report identifies strong macroeconomic management as one of the five essential ingredients to high and sustained growth rates (Commission on Growth and Development 2008).
Much has been written about the role of the IMF during economic crises (Woods 2008; Zagha and Nankani 2005) . But Fund influence has been stronger in non-crisis times, as the voice of both macroeconomic prudence and economic conservatism (Bretton Woods Committee 2009).
As the voice of prudence, often articulated through "Article IV" consultations with governments, the IMF frequently had allies in central banks or ministries of finance. They were happy to let the Fund take responsibility for fiscal and monetary rigidity that was deemed necessary but difficult to enact, given a recalcitrant government or hostile domestic political environment.
Hence, even proud and talented bureaucracies (as in India) valued harsh IMF prescriptions that
The subsequent measures imposed has sidelined the Fund from any meaningful role in East Asia since the financial crisis of 1997 (Sussangkarn 2010) . The "IMF approach" to liquidity crises, applied in the Republic of Korea in late 1997, was correctly disparaged by Stiglitz (2002) . In retrospect, the Fund clearly was thinking only of currency flows and not considering structural parameters, such as the high leverage of Korean firms (Stiglitz 2002) . During the crisis, interest rates were raised to levels that bankrupted many Korean conglomerates (chaebols), while not halting capital flight; this was a colossal blunder by the IMF. Luckily, Korea recovered quickly and exhibited strong macro fundamentals throughout, including a fiscal surplus entering the crisis. But other countries facing BOP problems not of their own making did not fare so well.
The casualty of harshly administered austerity programs was always economic growth, often set back for many years, usually led by precipitous cuts in infrastructure spending. As shown by Calderon and Serven (2004) , Latin America's growth rates suffered particularly due to fiscal contractions that hit infrastructure hardest. Economic growth rates were invariably taken as exogenous variables when their endogeneity was obvious; the reason was that although Fund programs are of short duration, their impact can be long lasting. Similarly, in today's crisis in Greece, an economy with neither monetary nor exchange rate levers, the fiscal contraction being advocated is incompatible with the resurgence of growth necessary to halt the decline.
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Past IMF financial models were impervious to growth concerns, and often to social issues as well. This led many DEs to follow rigid and slow growth paths. Others ignored the Fund and followed heterodox, rebellious paths that often led to worse economic outcomes, including high inflation, inflated currencies, and poor economic management; examples include periods of hyperinflation in Latin America and poor adjustment policies in the Philippines and elsewhere.
Other programs failed because IMF adjustment financing lasted two to three years, whereas structural adjustments often took at least twice as long. The Fund's one-size-fits-all approach of the 1970s and 1980s has been roundly criticized, because it led in many cases to a low-level equilibrium associated with low growth and economic underperformance. backing got more generously constructed bailout programs and better trade-offs between shortterm adjustment and long-term development.
Banking crises are among the most damaging to economic growth and development prospects (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996; Perry and Leipziger 1999 to "stabilize, liberalize, and privatize" had many adherents at the Fund. This ideology, similar to trickle-down economics, preaches that economic probity and market-based solutions will generate their own rewards. Few economies can afford to invest in this mantra, and even those with impeccable macroeconomic discipline have pursued additional nonmarket policies for growth (Amsden 1989; Kim and Leipziger 1993; Leipziger and Petri 1993) . The Washington
Consensus may have partly originated in the U.S. Treasury, which at the time advocated against state involvement in the economy and which took advantage of crises to promote neo-liberal reforms via Fund programs. Some countries were forced to choose between the policies advocated by the Fund and those promoted by development banks, like the World Bank. More fortunate countries played off one IFI against the other; the less fortunate were fed strong doses of draconian adjustment.
IFIs have always been governed and influenced by developed nations, and this has been somewhat controversial in terms of policy. As a developed nation, France was able to press the argument that the CFA zone (an exchange-rate regime tied to French franc) enhanced
The Role and Influence of IFIs DEs, needing the support of both institutions, often a necessary condition for capital market access, were forced to outsource many economic decisions. The term "cross-conditionality" gained prominence as issues of coherence and overlap became prevalent and charges of ideological bullying were voiced (Oxfam 2006) .
The The Bank also began to collect systematic data to track progress and to bolster its arguments.
Calculation of poverty numbers began in earnest in 1990 and to this day, the Bank is seen as the most legitimate source of many development statistics. 3 Governments have used poverty and income distribution data originating from the Bank to bolster applications for assistance, to help shape domestic policies, and to frame the dialogue around strategy. Data collection begun under multilateral programs made possible the "Progresa" conditional cash transfer program in Mexico, the similar "Bolsa Familiar" program in Brazil, and other social assistance policies.
Governments would not complain to the World Bank about its reported income distribution statistics if they did not have domestic and international significance.
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No development strategy during this period could avoid the intellectual work of Syrquin and Chenery (1989) on growth with distribution. No economic planning model could be designed without looking at the work of Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) . No project would be assessed without the benefit of Price Gittinger's Guide to Project Analysis (Gittinger 1972).
Major intellectual contributions abounded in the analysis of returns to education, optimal subsidy pricing, and the elements of cost-benefit analysis. These analytical tools had in common the measurement of who benefited from expenditures and how pricing could effectively be used to improve development outcomes. Practical manuals and models on road maintenance, electricity grid management, traffic safety, and many other infrastructure aspects were imported by DEs as best practices. Many governments sent officials to be trained or to be seconded to the World Bank. Many Bank officials returned to their home countries in high-level posts with experience drawn from actual country cases.
Critics complained that IFIs had an ideological bias that favored market solutions over government intervention, but this is not supported by the facts in many instances. Cross subsidies favoring the poor were a basic tool of analysis. Expenditure incidence analysis was commonplace to target service delivery. There were ideologies that favored getting the public sector out of nonessential economic arenas. But even in some critical areas such as the provision
The Governments usually reject advice that they abhor.
Major new strands of development thinking, such as the importance of institutions as explicated by North (1991) , were used by IFIs to promote practical development activity. Outside ideas also found acceptance at the Bank, and were supported by a vibrant research department. Major publications such as the annual World Development Report carried tremendous import, particularly in the first ten to fifteen years of its publication (Yusuf and Deaton 2009 Under the presidency of James Wolfensohn, a number of important bridges were crossed that had strong impacts on development thinking and practice, none more important that his decision to acknowledge the corrosiveness, wastefulness, and immorality of corruption (Wolfensohn 1996; Wolfensohn and Kircher 2005) . Similar to the work on income distribution and poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, the period from 1995 onward has been marked by the Bank's leadership in the area of governance. This leadership is evident in countries where anti-corruption surveys were conducted, public service scorecards were kept, and anti-corruption commissions or teams were formed. Success has been limited, but the global acceptance of transparency and anti-corruption efforts (aided also by the
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The current state of development thinking and practice
Since the onset of the financial and then global economic crisis in 2008, IFIs have struggled to stay relevant. Global economic trends in the twenty-first century do not favor MDBs. The continued rise of China is foremost among these trends. The country's astounding growth rate is driven by a favorable wage-productivity calculus, ambitious government-led export policies, prodigious savings, and the sheer size of the economy. This eastward shift has meant that southsouth trade has become less a catchphrase and much more a market reality. At the same time, flush liquidity in global financial markets in the early 2000s made access to capital easier than ever for DEs. Even previously capital-starved regions like Africa began to attract foreign investment, and it looked like IFIs were losing their clients. 5, 6 Massive precautionary lending in 2009-10 reversed this course temporarily but the trend remains.
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The IMF's situation worsened after its failed management of the East Asia crises. Those countries and others with access to external capital began accumulating reserves in rainy day funds and the IMF lost much of its business. Countries began to feel that they no longer needed Fund advice or insurance. Prudent macroeconomics was a well-accepted principle; however, more heterodox policies also began to emerge. They appeared not only in anti-capitalist governments in Venezuela and Bolivia, but also in the state policies of Brazil, India, and others seeking to follow the high-growth path of China and finding much to emulate in the Asian model (Mahbubani 2008) . The more stolid position of the World Bank and its preoccupations with social policies and anti-corruption efforts at the expense of growth made it less relevant to many DEs. 7 Bank and IMF policies, which hadn't changed much in the past decade, seemed more concerned with social policies and anti-corruption efforts than growth. The World Bank's business model seemed to be about maximizing the transfer of IDA resources to the poorest countries, lending to middle-income countries in carefully circumscribed conditions and sectors, and decentralizing in an ambitious attempt to get closer to the client. 8 The fact that James Wolfensohn was followed by a two-year president (Paul Wolfowitz) and a one-term president (Robert Zoellick) didn't help the Bank maintain its strategic edge or develop a strong global vision that would appeal to its clients.
The to be close to the client by decentralizing to the maximum, lost the competitive edge that its highly technical staff once provided. It is now a minor leaguer in a major league game.
Furthermore, the development paradigm offered by both IFIs has lost its glamour. The Fund has not been able to show that it could design adjustment programs that were pro-growth. Indeed, even its commitment to precautionary lending services has gone largely unused because countries fear the stigma of a "Fund program" of any kind. Indeed, in the 2008-10 crisis, it was the Bank that provided "precautionary" lending to its preferred clients like Mexico, India, Brazil, and Indonesia in the forms of quick loans for budget support (World Bank 2008) . 12 The advent of more statist policies by many BRICs, and the success of some of these policies, has also left DEs with the sense that they have learned all they can from IFIs. Yet, there are major challenges in health care financing, environmental management, urbanization, and risk mitigation.
However, unlike in past decades, the IFIs no longer seem to hold the answers, either intellectually or financially. The development agenda seems to have passed them by.
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Who is Leading in Development Thinking?
A seismic shift has occurred. The IMF has struggled for relevance and has changed its advisory tune to accommodate capital controls (such as Brazilian capital import taxes). The Fund has also acquiesced to join failed adjustment programs within the Eurozone membership. It has been lax on banking supervision issues, weak on imbalances, and inconsistent on exchange rate management. Despite its precautionary lending windows, the Fund has not helped countries deal with global uncertainty or capital flows. Therefore, it may well be true that a developing country finance minister can learn very little from the IMF these days.
The World Bank, a previous leader in many areas of development strategy, has been turned into a bystander in middle-income countries, a cheerleader in emerging economies, and reluctant crisis manager in post-conflict countries. Countries are more on their own than ever. This is in part because of paradigm shifts (see, for example, the notion of a new normal as espoused by El- The fact that the leadership of both institutions has remained unchanged-a European heading the Fund and an American heading the Bank-also has not improved the image of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). IMF members have witnessed its powerlessness to force China and the United States to deal with their imbalances; they have seen financing without a growth strategy for Greece; and they have seen the unmet gaps in international banking supervision.
Bank borrowers sense the lack of vision at helm of the institution and see the pursuit of bilateral development fetishes funded by trust funds. Moreover, DEs are searching for the right forum to discuss crucial issues, since the G8 has lost its power and the G20 some of its luster, the UN has limited implementation capacity, and the MDBs seem pre-occupied with internal reforms. This is the unfortunate state of affairs at a time of global stress.
Note that neither BWI has been persuasive in providing advice on job creation or containment of health care costs. Neither institution has been quick to redesign new financial instruments to
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Chapter 49 Page 31 reduce risk. While both are still sources data and projections, neither is any longer a major voice in the world of policy. And the fact that jobless growth and worsening distribution coexist with supposed recoveries, the fact that regulation on the advanced economies could be so poor, and the fact that many now advocate a more activist role for government in promoting growth has also taught DEs that some major paradigms may have flaws. If so, which other prescriptions might be faulty?
This cynicism about prevailing paradigms can lead to worse outcomes. Faced with difficult challenges, countries may decide to experiment with policies that are unlikely to yield better outcomes, and many mistakes can be made (Commission on Growth and Development 2008:
68-69 on Bad Ideas). Moreover, issues of jobless growth and distribution are creating discontent with globalization in rich countries. More active roles for the state are being contemplated, but are state institutions up to these new challenges?
The next decade may well be one dominated by risk management, new roles for the state, and greater expectations that distributional equity be addressed. How to square these concerns with
